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ABSTRACT
A prominent software security violation – buffer overflow attack has taken various forms and poses serious threats until today.
One such vulnerability is Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) attack. An ROP attack circumvents the Dynamic Execution
Prevention (DEP) which is employed in modern operating systems to prevent execution of data segments, and attempts
to execute unintended instructions by overwriting the stack exploiting the buffer overflow vulnerability. Numerous defense
mechanisms have been proposed in the past few years to mitigate/prevent the attack – compile time methods that add checking
logic to the program code before compilation, dynamic methods that monitor the control flow integrity during execution and
randomization methods that aim at randomizing instruction locations. This paper discusses 1) these different static, dynamic
and randomization techniques proposed recently and 2) compares the techniques based on their effectiveness and performances.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The fundamental purpose of software attack is to divert the
intended program flows and execute unintended instructions.
The term software attack appears more generic that includes
diverse types of applications ranging from Web and
desktop applications to simple programs such as calculator
performing addition of two numbers. A notorious form of
software attack vulnerability is exploitation of memory. This
comes in different forms like buffer overflow, heap overflow
[1] and format string vulnerability [1]. Among them, buffer
overflow vulnerability [2] is the most prominent one in which
the attacker can overflow a buffer’s boundary in the process’
stack and overwrite the return address of a function with
an arbitrary memory address such that he/she can execute
any code in this overwritten address when the vulnerable
function returns. Buffer overflow attack has attracted many
researchers’ attentions and numerous defense mechanisms
have been proposed and employed to mitigate the attack.
These defense methods prevent execution of code that is
present in the data regions of the process, for example in
stack or/and heap. Modern operating systems employ Data
Execution Prevention (DEP) using the W ⊕ X security
model, in which the memory location can be either be
executable or writable but cannot be both. In such a way, the
attacker cannot write code and execute it at the same address
of stack or heap.
Despite the employment of such methods, attackers are
still able to find ways to execute unintended code by making
use of already existing code in the process’ address space
instead of injecting new code. A well known form of this
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attack is the return-into-libc attack [3]. In a return-into-
libc attack, the attacker overwrites the return address of
a vulnerable function with the address of any function in
the libc library. For example, the attacker could overwrite
with the address of a ‘system’ function, by which a shell
can be opened. A shell is a powerful backdoor which
enables performing multiple operations. Return-Oriented
Programming(ROP) is a specific form of the return-into-
libc attack, in which the attacker tries to execute sections
of code scattered across the process address space by
linking them with indirect control transfer instructions,
typically the ‘ret’ instruction. Numerous ROP exploits have
been demonstrated recently that target at products like
AdobeReader, AdobeFlash Player, Internet Explorer and so
on. Since its appearance, ROP has being a very hot topic of
research with various types of ROP attacks being proposed
in parallel with some defense methods that prevent such
linking of instruction sequences [4]. Among those proposed
approaches, some of them are compile time approaches and
some of them are dynamic.
The main contributions of this paper include:
• Briefly discuss about Return-Oriented Programming
and some of the defense strategies adopted by defense
mechanisms.
• Provides a high-level classification of recently
proposed defense techniques and investigate some of
them.
• Provides a comparative evaluation of the discussed
techniques based on certain identified criteria - Gen-
eral Solution Correctness, ROP specific Effectiveness
and Performance Metrics.
• Shows some important aspects to be considered
towards developing an effective defense solution
against ROP.
2. BACKGROUND
Return-Oriented Programming as mentioned before, is a type
of return-into-libc attack [3]. As proposed by Shacham [5]
[6], the attacker usually performs the attack in two steps:
1) In the first step, the attacker identifies sequence of
instructions useful in performing his/her intended operations.
This short sequence of instructions is called a ‘gadget’ and is
typically between 2 and 5 instructions in length. However
there is no limitation on the gadgets’ length and it has not
been proven that it is infeasible to have longer gadgets. Also
the attacker can identify more than one gadget.
2) Then in the second step the attacker link these identified
gadgets (from the first step) together in such a way that they
are executed sequentially.
An overview of the ROP exploit is shown in Figure 1.
The attacker first finds a vulnerable function in the process
address space, either belonging to the application or included
in external or internal libraries, such that the function would
be executed during the actual program execution. He/she
then overwrites the stack data with the intended return
addresses (i.e the start addresses of the gadgets). The gadgets
should end in indirect control transfer instruction, mostly the
‘ret’ instruction serves this purpose. Every time the actual
operation (gadget) is executed, the ‘ret’ instruction at the
end of the gadget pops the next value (which is the next
gadget’s address) in the stack, which becomes the new EIP.
The attacker may also insert data values into the stack which
can be used as arguments for the unintended instructions to
be executed.
Figure 1. ROP Overview [7]
The technique which was first identified and explained
above uses only the ‘return’ instruction for diverting the
control flow of the program and transferring it to the
unintended program’s flow. However the ‘return’ instruction
is not the only way of transferring control. There are other
indirect control transfer instructions like the indirect ‘jmp’
and indirect ‘call’ instructions, in which the address of the
target instructions are stored in the argument registers of
these ‘jmp/call’ instructions. Therefore the attacker can use
such instructions as well to divert the control flow and
execute code that he/she intends to. This was demonstrated
by Checkoway.et.al [8] in 2010 which proposed Return-
Oriented Programming using return like instructions rather
than directly using the return instruction. For example, the
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instruction sequence “pop %eax; jmp %eax;” is similar
to a ‘ret’ instruction which pops the top of stack to
EIP register and executes the instruction at the address
contained in EIP. Following Checkoway.et.al’s proposal, a
similar technique called Jump Oriented Programming (JOP)
was proposed by Bletsch.et.al [9]. JOP is very similar to
ROP and it uses gadgets to perform operations which are
chained together by a dispatcher gadget rather than the
‘ret’ instruction in ROP. The gadgets are linked through
‘jmp’ instructions and the dispatcher gadget takes care of
executing them in sequence. The gadget sequence is stored
in a dispatcher table in the process memory (overwritten by
exploiting a memory vulnerability) and is independent of the
stack. Therefore any ROP defense mechanism that depends
only on the stack or the ‘ret’ instructions can detect only the
original ROP attack and are vulnerable to the later proposed
variations of the same.
Although a Turing-complete program can be formed using
ROP, typically attackers use them targeting at only certain
functions, such as ‘system’ functions, that spawn a shell or
those functions which can change the memory settings of the
process to undo certain permissions. Especially by changing
the DEP setting, the attacker can directly overwrite the stack
with the intended code and execute from the stack itself,
instead of making a more difficult attempt of formulating
a Return-Oriented Program attacks to perform the intended
operations. A program binary may contain many gadgets
which are helpful for the attacker. Schwartz.et,al in [10]
demonstrated the existence of many potential ROP payloads
(or gadgets) in more than 80% of programs that are larger
than 20KB.
3. DEFENSE STRATEGIES
In this section we discusses certain criteria that many
recently proposed approaches concentrate on for detection
of ROP. Following is a list of proposed defense strategies:
a) Gadget Elimination: Prevent the formation of gadgets,
i.e. sequence of instructions that end with an indirect control
transfer instruction that could be potentially used by the
attacker. Since gadgets are the backbone of ROP, eliminating
them as much as possible would reduce the vulnerability
space for exploitation by attackers. Some of the useful
instructions that are commonly exploited by the attackers
are instructions manipulating registers, storing values into
the register (via pop instruction), restoring values from the
register (via push instruction) and other similar instructions.
b) Control Flow Integrity (CFI): Prevent the program
execution flow transferred from intended and legitimate
return addresses. In [11], the authors first proposed a
formal research work on how Control Flow Integrity can
avoid exploitation of an application by different types of
software attacks. Ensuring Control Flow Integrity based on
the Control Flow Graph (CFG) of a program (graph depicting
the possible paths of execution of the program) prevents any
diversion from expected behavior of the program execution.
In the case of ROP particularly, enforcing the integrity of
control transfer instructions ensures prevention from gadget
chain execution.
c) Unaligned Instructions: It is important to understand
that program instructions could be aligned or unaligned.
Aligned instructions are the original sequences of instruc-
tions as intended by the program and compiled by the com-
piler. Unaligned instructions are those instructions that can
be formed from the original instruction sequence although
they are not intended to be executed as such. Due to the
fact that instructions in certain processor architectures can
be of varying length and unaligned memory access is pos-
sible, instructions can be executed beginning from random
memory addresses and these are the unaligned instructions.
For example, consider the following set of instructions [7]:
B8 13 00 00 00 mov $0x13, %eax
E9 C3 F8 FF FF jmp 3aae9
Since a gadget is a short sequence of instructions typically
ending in the ‘ret’ (C3) instruction, the above instruction
sequence contains a potential gadget as shown below which
can be exploited by the attacker (for manipulating register
value):
00 00 add %al, (%eax)
00 E9 add %ch, %cl
C3 ret
Therefore a complete defense mechanism that either
eliminates gadgets or enforces control flow integrity should
also be able to handle such unaligned instructions for
complete coverage.
In addition to ROP’s specific features, following are some
of the general defense strategies observed in other defense
approaches.
d) Deployment: The technique must facilitate easy
deployment being compatible with different operating
systems and processor architectures. It is also preferred that
the deployment and the execution of the technique depends
on minimal or even without side information like source
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code, symbolic debugging information etc. since these may
not be available with production binaries.
e) Performance: This is an integral feature of any software
that primarily includes space overhead, runtime overhead
and few other factors. The execution of the technique
along with the actual program should not affect users’
experiences. It may not be possible to completely eliminate
such overheads, however it is expected that the impact is
minimal.
4. CLASSIFICATION OF DEFENSE
APPROACHES
Based on the trend observed in recently proposed defense
mechanisms, these techniques can be briefly classified as
shown in Figure 2. It is important to note that this is not
the complete classification, rather it is only based on the
techniques surveyed by this paper.
Randomization: Randomization includes a) Address
Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) – This technique was
the first kind of defense mechanisms proposed to defend
against ROP. Address Space Layout Randomization [12]
randomize the base addresses of parts of the process in the
process address space like the stack, heap, external libraries
etc., such that the attacker cannot predict the address where
these would be loaded, which in turn means he/she cannot
predict the addresses of his/her intended gadgets to overwrite
the stack. ASLR was used in conjunction with DEP to protect
against ROP. However since only the base addresses are
re-located and not for each individual address within the
components, if the base address can be found, then all other
addresses relative to the base address can also be found.
Roglia.et.al [13] proposed a method to find the base address
of libc if the attacker can find the absolute address of any
function in that library. If the base address of libc can be
found, then it is easy to compute the addresses of any other
functions in libc using the Global Offset Table (GOT). Also
some parts of the process which are not compatible with
this randomization are unrandomized and attackers can find
useful gadgets in them. For these reasons, this technique has
not been of researchers’ interests in recent proposed defense
mechanisms against ROP attacks.
b) Instruction Randomization – This approach primarily
aims at randomizing a single or block of instruction(s),
thereby affecting the attackers’ entry point itself. The
attacker needs to know the addresses of the instructions
that he/she intends to use beforehand. The fundamental
purpose of instruction randomization is to change the layout
of the instructions as predicted by the attacker. This can be
done by changing instructions’ sequence order or replacing
an instruction with semantically equivalent instruction,
randomizing the addresses of the instruction [14]. Since
the modification is done before execution, performance
overhead is typically minimal in these approaches. However,
in most cases one has to get access to the source code or
debug symbols and disassemblers to make the modifications
without affecting the control flow graph. Approaches have
been proposed without the requirement of access to such
side information, however they are not guaranteed to provide
complete coverage [15]. Another disadvantage of Instruction
Randomization is that position-dependent code cannot be
randomized.
Compiler Based approaches: The compiler based
solutions modify the code layout of the program at compile
time itself. Typical defense strategies employed by these
approaches are adding code that can check and validate
the control flow integrity at the runtime, particularly by
controlling the behavior of free branch instructions. Some of
them also try to eliminate gadgets by rewriting instructions
with other semantically equivalent instructions. It is apparent
that source code is required, as the changes are done at
compile time. For this reason, the deployment of these
compile time approaches is difficult as it is not feasible to
get access to the source code of production binaries.
Dynamic approaches: These approaches perform check-
ing dynamically by monitoring the control flow integrity
of the program. Some of the usual patterns observed
and handled by dynamic approaches are checking for the
source/destination of indirect control transfer instructions
– ‘ret’, ‘jmp’ and ‘call’, saving and checking for match-
ing ‘call/ret’ addresses, checking for the frequency of ‘ret’
instructions etc. Since the method is dynamic, most of them
do not require access to source code/debug symbols, however
some approaches are involved in pre-processing stage, where
the compiled binary is examined to identify potential gadgets
that could be used during runtime for comparison. Also
there is a significant and noticeable performance overhead in
these approaches owing to runtime monitoring. Few subtypes
identified in Dynamic approaches are:
a) Binary instrumentation: ROP checking logic is
instrumented to the program during execution using a binary
instrumentation framework.
b) Hardware-facilitated: Registers available as part of the
processor are used by the ROP checking logic, which is
implemented as a kernel module.
4 ; 00:1–21 c© John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Figure 2. ROP Defense Techniques Classification
c) Stack-trace analysis: The stack trace is analyzed based
on certain heuristics and checked for potential ROP exploits.
A brief comparison of the different approach types is
given in Table I.
5. PROPOSED DEFENSE TECHNIQUES
In this section we briefly discusses some of the recent
proposed approaches under each type (as shown in Figure
2) to detect and mitigate ROP attacks.
5.1. Randomization
5.1.1. In-place code randomization
Pappas.et.al [16] proposed a compile time approach that
performs code transformation i.e transform one (or more)
instruction(s) to another set of instrunction(s) such that
they are semantically equivalent. This transformation is
done to either eliminate formation of gadgets or modify
them such that the intended (gadget) operation may not be
performed completely. This method is designed to work even
when there is no symbolic debugging information available
with the binary. Disassemblers that would work without
debug symbols can be used to analyze the instructions,
however they cannot provide 100% disassembly coverage.
The authors of [16] used IDAPro disassembler for their
prototype implementation.
There are basically two types of modifications of
instructions proposed:
• Atomic substitution
• Instruction re-ordering
– Intra basic block re-ordering
– Re-ordering of Register Preservation code
– Register reassignment
Atomic substitution: Instructions that may be involved
in formation of gadgets can be substituted with different
instructions such that the ‘C3’ byte which can also be
executed as a ‘ret’ instruction is removed, while maintaining
the semantics of the instruction equivalent.
As shown in Figure 3 there is a gadget formatted
from unaligned instructions before transformation. The
corresponding instruction can be transformed in to an
equivalent form to remove the ‘C3’ byte in the instruction
sequence.
Intra basic block re-ordering: Independent instructions
within a basic block can be re-ordered such that unaligned
gadgets can be eliminated. The dependence graph, which
is a graph depicting relationship between the instructions
of the basic blocks, can be used to identify independent
instructions. An example of re-ordering is shown in Figure 4
and its corresponding dependence graph is shown in Figure
5.
Re-ordering Register Preservation code: Functions some-
times save register values before performing the operations
and restore them at the end. These values are usually saved
in the stack itself by a series of push and pop instructions.
Reordering of the push/pop instructions may modify the
expected behavior of gadgets intended to happen by the
attacker. This approach modifying the register saving instruc-
tions is adopted since instructions with pop/ret pattern are
popular in ROP gadgets.
Register re-assignment: Live region of a register is the
region between where the register is defined and last used.
The approach proposes to re-assign registers within the same
boundaries of live regions, such that only the names of the
registers are exchanged and the data at the corresponding
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Table I. Comparison of ROP defense approaches
Approach Strength Weakness
Compiler-based
• Runtime efficiency
• Employs information transformation in
addition to gadget protection
• No binary re-writing
• Need source code
• Comparatively deployment is not eas-
ier
• Recompilation required when program
changes
Randomization
• Prevents the attackers’ entry point itself
• Runtime overhead better than dynamic
approaches, but higher than compiler-
based approaches
• Easy transformation of most instruc-
tions
• Need source code or debug symbols for
some techniques
• Position-dependent code cannot be
randomized
• Space overhead higher in some cases
• Chances of error, due to incorrect
randomization
Dynamic approaches
• No source code or debug symbols
• Minimal or nil binary re-writing
• Does not require re-compilation if
program changes
• Often higher runtime overhead
• Often dependent on memory limits or
consider only few parts of application
code
• Significant Space overhead in some
cases
Figure 3. Atomic substitution [16]
Figure 4. Intra basic-block re-ordering [16]
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Figure 5. Dependence graph of instructions in Figure 4 [16]
memory locations are not affected. This re-assignment could
possibly affect the intended gadget behavior.
This type of randomization has a significant advantage of
no dependence on side information, i.e symbolic debugging
information. However this is offered at the expense of the
inability of complete coverage. Only around 80% partial
coverage is obtained on average with 10% being complete
elimination of gadgets and the remaining being modification
of the gadget behavior. Regarding the entropy, 80% of
gadgets seem to have four or more possible ways of
randomization and 12% of gadgets have two possible ways.
5.1.2. Instruction Location Randomization
Hiser et.al, [17] proposed a randomization approach to
randomize every instruction in the program, to thwart any
ROP attack based on the assumption of instruction addresses.
A ROP attack is typically carried out by populating addresses
in the stack, in which the attacker needs to be aware
of the addresses of the instructions in advance. Therefore
randomizing the addresses would prevent the attacker’s
intended behavior. The method consists of two stages:
1) Offline Analysis: The program binary is analyzed for
every byte and all possible instructions are identified and
inserted into the database. This includes the original intended
instructions and the unaligned instructions as well. This
method makes no attempt to classify the instructions as
intended or unintended. Offline Analysis includes analysis
of indirect branch targets and call sites as well. The results
of the offline analysis is a set of re-write rules that contain
the actual locations of the instructions and the redirection
information for the randomized instructions. Therefore the
instructions are scattered apart and the expected sequence
information is maintained by the re-write rules. However
certain addresses cannot be randomized directly since they
may be relative to the return addresses or other locations.
In such cases, the original instruction is left unchanged,
however the branch target contains a rewrite rule which
points to a randomized address.
2) Running the ILR protected program: The ILR protected
program is run using a per-process virtual machine(VM)
like Strata in this case. The virtual machine, before fetching
and executing the instructions, applies the translations made
by the offline analysis dissembler. It executes an instruction
and then to execute the next instruction, looks up at the re-
write rules, identifies the location of the next instruction and
executes it fetching from that location.
Most of the binary is covered, except for indirect branch
targets that are not identified by the disassembler and
position-dependent code. Also the external libraries included
in program are not randomized by this approach. With the
prototype implementation, the average overhead is from 13-
16%, almost half of it due to the use of the per-process in
VM.
5.1.3. Marlin
Gupta.et.al, [18] proposed yet another randomization
approach similar to ILR, but instead of randomizing every
instruction, this technique randomizes every function block
of the program. The rationale, as claimed by the authors,
behind choosing to randomize function blocks is to draw
a fine line in the granularity achieved between the higher
performance overhead incurred due to randomizing every
instruction/every basic block or randomizing only the
program segments (like ASLR). A significant advantage of
this method is, the randomization is done by a modified
loader at load-time. Therefore every execution of the
program results in different randomizations, making it
difficult for the attacker to predict the code layout. A brief
discussion about the steps involved in Marlin is listed below:
1) Pre-processing step: Since this technique randomizes
function blocks, it is essential to know the addresses of these
blocks in the program binary. For this reason, debug symbols
are required. However since many application binaries are
not provided with debug symbols, external tools to unstrip
the application are used.
2) Randomization: The randomization algorithm gener-
ates a random permutation and the function blocks are
shuffled according to this permutation. Since there might be
‘jmp’ instructions within the function blocks and they might
be dependent on relative addresses, in order to not affect their
behaviors, a jump table is maintained during the execution of
the algorithm, which maintains the old and new addresses of
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the functions. After the shuffling is done, based on the jump
table, the jump offsets are modified according to the new
addresses. This step is called jump patching. After that, the
jump table is deleted, to prevent the attacker from knowing
the new location of the instructions.
However, not every function can be randomized, since
for some functions if they are changed from their original
locations they may be rendered useless or even result in
some exceptions, a typical example is the start function.
Therefore only those position-independent functions can be
randomized.
5.2. Compiler-based approaches
5.2.1. Return-less kernels
Li.et.al, [19] proposed a compiler based approach to
defeat return-oriented rootkits. Return-oriented rootkits as
explained and demonstrated by Hund.et.al, [20], is a
malicious Return-Oriented Program that can attack the
kernel code without exposing the fact that the kernel has
been attacked. For example, a ‘ps’ or ‘ls’ would not list the
malicious or unintended processes in running. The approach
proposed to prevent this return-oriented rootkits (ROR) is
through return indirection. Instead of directly saving the
return addresses in the stack, a return index is stored during
the ‘call’ instruction. This return index points to a return
address entry in a centralized return address table, looking up
which the actual return address can be retrieved at runtime.
Since this return address table contains the return addresses
of functions, this can be generated offline. Therefore only
valid return indices ( i.e legitimate ‘ret’ instructions that
follow ‘call’ instructions) contain entries in the return
address table and random gadgets’ addresses populated by
the attacker in the stack would not be the valid indices and
hence the attack fails.
The method therefore requires compiler support such that
it can perform this translation as depicted in the Figure 6 -
for every ‘call’ instruction, the return index corresponding
to the return address is pushed into the stack and for the
corresponding ‘ret’ instruction, instead of popping a return
address, the return index is used to compute the return
address and the control is transferred to that address.
The authors also proposed to remove unintended return
opcodes (C3) from the instructions by two techniques :
a) Register re-allocation : If the usage of certain registers’
machine code contains the return opcode, rewrite the
instruction to replace with another register whose machine
code does not contain the ‘C3’ opcode.
Figure 6. Return-less kernels [19]
b) Peephole optimization : Similar to register re-
allocation, if the operands contain the return opcode, replace
them with equivalent instructions without changing the
semantics but removing the return opcode.
Since every legitimate ‘ret’ instruction should be preceded
by a ‘call’ instruction, all entries in the centralized table are
valid return addresses and hence there is no probable reason
for any false alarm.
5.2.2. G-Free
This technique proposed by Onarlioglu.et.al, [21] is the
first compiler-based approach proposed to defend against
both ‘ret’ based gadgets and other indirect control transfer
like ‘jmp/call’ based gadgets as well. Similar to the return-
less kernel approach, this approach also aims to prevent
gadgets from unaligned instructions and protect branches
formed from aligned legitimate instructions. The authors’
experiments reveal that there are around 18K free branch
instructions present in the libc library. This means, the
attacker has many ways of forming gadget sequences to
perform his/her intended behaviors. Gadgets/free branch
instructions in aligned instructions are protected by adding
code at the prologue/epilogue of the function calls, that
check for legitimate execution of the function block. The
functionality performed by the code is – when a function is
called i.e. at the function ‘call’ instruction, it encrypts the
return address and pushes it into the stack with a random
key, and when the function returns i.e at the ‘ret’ instruction,
it decrypts the saved return address with the same random
key to compute the original value. If an attacker pushes
an arbitrary return address into the stack, when the ‘ret’
instruction is executed and the decryption results in an
invalid value such that the attack is detected. The authors,
however, have not given any details about how a computed
address is checked for validity/invalidity. Similarly for other
8 ; 00:1–21 c© John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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free branch instructions like ‘jmp’, a technique called frame
cookie is used. When a function/block containing a ‘jmp’
instruction is executed a frame cookie is computed using
the same random key and pushes it into the stack. Then just
before the free branch instruction, validation is performed
to check for the validity of the cookie. If there is no cookie
pushed or the computed value does not match with the
stored cookie, it is assumed to be an attack. The authors
also propose to add alignment sleds (nop instructions) before
these code blocks, so that they cannot be executed in an
unaligned fashion too.
For the prevention of gadgets formation in unaligned
instructions, the occurrence of the corresponding instruction
bytes needs to be avoided. For example, the bytes, ‘C3, C2,
CA, CB’ for ‘ret’ instructions and ‘FF’ for ‘jmp’ instruction.
The authors proposed different kinds of instruction sequence
re-writing techniques to achieve the elimination. They
are Register re-allocation (similar to Return-less kernel
technique) – replaces register operands to remove the ‘C3’
byte, Instruction transformation – replaces an instruction
that has a free branch byte with an equivalent instruction,
Offset Adjustments – adjust or modify the offset of the
operands of the ‘jmp’ instruction if a ‘ret’ instruction byte is
encountered. This offset adjustment can be done by adding
nop instructions accordingly. This way, the authors claimed
that it is possible to eliminate many gadgets formation.
5.2.3. Control Flow locking
Bletsch.et.al, [22] proposed another compiler time
technique to detect Return-Oriented Programming attacks.
As discussed in Section 3, ensuring the CFI of the program
prevents ROP from happening. The CFL approach targets
at the same purpose – ensuring the program execution
follows the pre-determined control flow. To achieve this,
a mechanism similar to mutex locking is used excluding
the waiting/atomicity. A lock is acquired at the entry point
and unlocked at the exit point. Acquiring/releasing lock is
achieved by updating a variable in memory. The technique,
as with other compiler-based techniques, proposes two main
ideas to protect aligned and unaligned instruction sequences:
• Remove unintended code : Unintended code can be
removed by adding no-op bytes to instructions so that
every instruction is aligned to a n-byte boundary. This
also means that every target of indirect control flow
transfer is also aligned to n-byte boundary.
• Protect intended code : To protect intended code,
all indirect transfer control locations are identified
from the control flow graph (CFG), such as the
‘jmp/call’ instructions, call sites, ‘ret’ instructions etc.
Lock/unlock code is then added to these identified
locations appropriately such that acquiring ‘lock’ sets
the value of the control flow key ‘k’ to a particular
value and ‘unlock’ validates to check if the ‘k’
value matches with the control flow key value of
that particular control path. The authors chose to
use unique values for different control paths, rather
than a single bit same value for all control paths,
since setting ‘k’ to a single bit value ensures the
transfer passed through any valid entry point. This
can be misused by the attacker to evade the protection
mechanism. Therefore to avoid that, the authors chose
to use unique values for every control flow path.
However, since direct calls cannot be modified by the
attacker, they do not require the locking mechanism.
An overview of the proposed control flow lock
checking at different locations is shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7. Control-FLow Locking [22]
The protection mechanism is implemented in two phases
before execution:
1) Pre-assembly phase: An assembly re-writer removes
possibility of unintended code by aligning instructions in
the specified n-byte boundary. It then inserts the lock/unlock
code before indirect control transfers, with dummy values for
‘k’ since the complete control flow graph is not yet known.
2) Post-link phase: The assembly re-writer can now
extract the CFG and compute the actual ‘k’ values and update
the same in the lock/unlock accordingly.
Since the control flow locking ensures proper value of
‘k’ of a particular control flow path via the lock/unlock,
the technique cannot report false behavior unless the value
of ‘k’ is compromised or the extracted CFG is incomplete
or wrong. The correctness also depends on the correct
computation/checking of the ‘k’ values at each control
transfer locations.
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5.3. Dynamic Approaches
5.3.1. ROPDefender
Davi et.al, [7] proposed a binary instrumentation method
to detect ROP attacks based on ‘ret’ address comparison.
The method works by maintaining a shadow stack to keep
track of expected return addresses and comparing the actual
return addresses with the expected addresses (Figure 8). PIN,
a dynamic instrumentation framework is used to implement
the method.
Figure 8. High level approach of ROPDefender [7]
Instrumentation using PINtool: Instrumentation routine
checks if the given instruction is ‘call’ or ‘ret’ and analysis
the routine. For the ‘call’ instruction, it checks that if it
pushes the corresponding return address into the shadow
stack. And in a ‘ret’ instruction checking, the actual return
address is compared with the expected address in the stack.
These two types of checking are implemented within the
PINtool API [23] [24]. When the process which needs to
be monitored is executed in the PIN environment, the PIN
tool examines the first/last instruction of basic blocks and at
the same time appropriate analysis routines are instrumented
using the JIT compiler of the PIN framework. For every ‘call’
instruction the return address is pushed into the shadow stack
and for every ‘ret’ instruction the address at the top of the
stack is popped and compared with the actual return address
popped from the actual program stack. A mismatch in the
return address implies a ROP attack and that process will
be terminated. Though earlier proposed approaches take a
similar approach, this method handles some of the unusual
scenarios like exception and signal handling.
This tool has several advantages over the previous
approaches. It handles the following exceptional cases which
are not taken into account in the previous approaches:
a) Setjmp/Longjmp: When system calls like
‘setjmp/longjmp’ are executed, stack frames are bypassed
and this may lead to mismatch in the return addresses and
then raises false alarms. To handle such type of cases,
ROPDefender pops the return addresses continuously from
the stack until there is match or the stack is empty. The
former case is due to ‘longjmp’ and the latter implies a ROP
attack.
b) Unix Signals/Lazy binding: When signal handler is
invoked, there is no call instruction that gets invoked. To
prevent false positive, ROPDefender uses signal detector
API and pushes the appropriate return address into stack.
Similarly when lazy loading happens the return address may
not be available until the call instruction is actually executed.
Again ROPDefender pushes the computed return address
before the ‘ret’ is actually invoked.
c) C++ Exceptions: In C++ when the function does not
handle any exceptions, stack unwinding will happen until
a function that handles exception is found in program.
ROPDefender pushes the computed return address (to be
executed after the exception handling completes) by the
library functions during the stack unwinding process.
5.3.2. Control Flow Monitoring
Chen.et.al, [25] proposed the first dynamic method to
detect ROP attacks based on different types of gadgets
according to three instructions – ‘ret’, ‘call’ and ‘jmp’. The
method depends on ensuring programs’ control flow integrity
rather than the type of instructions. The authors discussed
about monitoring the control flow in three scenarios:
a) ‘call’ instruction: When a ‘call’ instruction is
executed, the control should flow to an instruction that
is the prologue of the function. This could be either
a ‘sub esp, value’ instruction for a frame function or
‘push ebp, mov ebp, esp’ instruction sequence for a
non-frame function. Therefore after a ‘call’, the next
instruction is checked against either of these instructions.
b) ‘ret’ instruction: A ‘ret’ instruction usually transfers
control to the next instruction after the caller, by popping the
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saved address from the stack. Therefore to maintain the ‘ret’
integrity, the authors proposed to maintain a shadow stack
mechanism similar to the ROPDefender approach [7], in
which after each ‘ret’ instruction, the popped return address
from the program stack is checked against the saved return
address in the shadow stack.
c) ‘jmp’ instruction: The authors say that the ‘jmp’
instructions are typically used to jump between locations
within the same function and hence propose to deem any
jump between different functions/libraries as an ROP attack.
This technique is typically implemented using the PIN
instrumentation framework [23] for runtime monitoring.
Also for static and dynamic analysis of the libraries and
resolution of addresses which is used during the runtime
monitoring, the technique uses the IDAPro disassembler and
ReadELF.
5.3.3. kBouncer
Pappas.et.al [26] who proposed a binary rewriting method
earlier [16], also proposed a dynamic method to monitor
the control flow integrity of the program by making use
of the Last Branch Record (LBR) feature provided by the
Intel(R) processors. LBR is a cache like facility provided
by the processor, which includes a set of model-specific
registers that stores the source and destination address of the
branches in branch/target register pairs. Since a typical ROP
exploit always tries to gain control of the victim program,
it is usually done via system calls which are wrapped in
wrapper functions in Unix-like systems and in API calls
in Windows. Therefore instead of checking the LBR stack
for every indirect branch instruction, it can be checked only
during such API calls that perform system-level operations.
The authors have chosen to enforce the LBR stack check at
the time the API is invoked itself, since in more than 50%
of the API calls (for system call invocation), the number
of legitimate branches between the API call and the actual
system call exceeds the total limit on the number of the LBR
registers. Therefore it is best to check at the entry point itself
i.e API call itself to check if the API call was legitimate or
not.
The authors proposed to identify illegitimate operations
by using two key attributes:
• Illegal ‘ret’ instructions are not preceded by call sites.
Any ‘ret’ instruction should transfer control to an
instruction which is located after the corresponding
call site of the caller function. This is the usual
flow in a normal legitimate function execution. Since
ROP gadgets transfer control from ‘ret’ to arbitrary
locations in the functions, illegal ‘ret’ instructions can
be detected.
• Since ROP code consists of many gadgets chained
together, this attribute aims to analyze the LBR stack
for the recent instructions and check if a particular
target address is followed by uninterrupted instruction
sequence (of maximum length 20) ending at the
branch address of the next level. If there exists a
sequence like this, it is assumed to be a gadget and
when a sequence of 8 or more gadgets exists, it is
assumed to be ROP exploit.
The kBouncer – which is the prototype developed by the
authors of [26] to demonstrate the proposed branch tracing
technique consists of three components:
a) Gadget Extraction component : This component
examines the executable application and identifies gadgets
(intended and unintended) by taking into account different
types of indirect control transfers including ‘ret’, ‘jmp’, ‘call’
instructions. The output of the process is stored in two hash
tables, one for the call-preceded gadgets (i.e gadgets where
‘ret’ instructions transfer the control to instructions that are
preceded by a ‘call’ instruction) and the other to store all
other kind of gadgets.
b) Interposition component: This component is imple-
mented on a Detours framework – a framework to intercept
function calls, to call the kernel module to enable LBR
feature. It also sends messages to the kernel module to
analyze the LBR stack whenever a sensitive API is called.
c) Kernel Component : The kernel component does the
actual check on the LBR stack based on the previously
described key attributes. For every ‘ret’ in the LBR stack,
starting from the last but one register pair (ignoring the
last pair, since it actually denotes the current API call), the
kernel module checks if there is a ‘call’ instruction that
precedes the target. The kernel module also checks for every
target address (to also account for branches due to ‘call/jmp’
instructions), whether it is a part of any gadget by looking
for the address in the stored hash tables and identifies those
potential gadgets and hence the corresponding illegitimate
executions.
Since the technique uses hardware-facilitated registers and
the checks are performed only for selective sensitive API
calls, the performance overhead is minimal. The authors
claimed a worst time overhead of only upto 4% in their
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test on Wine test suite, which calls windows API functions
extensively.
5.3.4. ROPecker
Cheng.et.al [27] proposed a sliding window oriented
dynamic method to detect ROP attack based on the past and
future execution flow of the program. The method makes
use of the LBR registers available in the hardware similar to
the kBouncer technique. The method consists of two stages:
offline pre-processing and runtime detection of gadgets.
a) Offline pre-processing: The application binary is
analyzed for potential gadgets and the details are stored in
a instruction database. The pre-processor disassembles and
analyzes the first six instructions starting from each byte of
the code segment in the binary and stores information about
the instruction sequence for every byte in the code segment.
If the instruction sequence ends in a indirect branch, the
tool considers the sequence as a potential gadget and stores
information accordingly in the database.
b) Runtime Detection: Initially all pages of the code
segment are marked as non-executable ( by setting the No
eXecute bit) and a sliding window is maintained at all
times. Beginning from the first page, for every new page
accessed an exception is raised and ROP checking logic is
triggered. If the gadget chain formed so far is above the
threshold, the program is terminated. Else the page is set
as executable by ROPecker and the window is slided to
this new page. The same process is repeated throughout
the program execution, by raising exceptions whenever code
outside the sliding window is accessed. Although the code
segments are protected by the sliding window mechanism,
some system calls like ‘mmap’ and ‘mprotect’ which sets
execution permissions can disable the DEP protection such
that no exception will be raised when the code outside the
sliding window is executed.
The runtime detection is therefore triggered under two
scenarios – when the code outside sliding window is
executed and risky system calls like ‘mprotect’ and ‘mmap’
are executed. The runtime detection is implemented as a
kernel module (in Figure 9) which checks the previous
and future execution flow of the program for potential
gadgets. For the past execution, the module checks the recent
branches in the LBR registers if the source is an indirect
branch instruction and destination is a gadget start address
(using the instruction database). If a gadget chain of such
gadgets is found (with a minimum gadget chain length),
then it is assumed as a ROP attack and the program is
terminated. However LBR registers may not only contain
branch instructions of the same program. In such cases, the
formed gadget chain may be less than the threshold value.
For efficient detection, the authors proposed to also check
the future execution flow, by examining the next instructions
in the stack for potential gadget addresses and comparing
them with the addresses stored in the database. For ‘jmp’-
based targets, instruction emulation is performed since the
targets are determined dynamically and the database may not
contain that information.
Figure 9. Overview of ROPecker [27]
The method although has a minimal performance
overhead, there are some scenarios when the method may
not be effective and efficient. The tool works on information
from a database which is formed assuming gadgets of six
instructions in length. In case that the adversary can form
gadgets less or more than six, and insert them in between
regular gadgets, the gadget chain length may never reach
the threshold and the tool would not work. Also when the
gadgets fall within the sliding window, they may be executed
without any exceptions raised.
5.3.5. ROPGuard
This is yet another dynamic method proposed by Ivan [28]
which uses a technique of monitoring the execution flow
during the program execution. The execution flow, instead
of being checked for every instruction, is checked when
certain ‘critical functions’ are executed. Critical functions
as assumed by the author, are functions that try to change
memory permission settings or create new processes from the
current process that may not be protected by DEP. The author
suggested the following series of checks whenever such
critical functions (details or specifics of the critical function
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are stored in a configuration file which the ROPGuard uses
at runtime) are called to ensure ROP detection.
• Check the stack pointer: Since the stack needs to be
modified with required return addresses, the attacker
may sometimes modify the stack pointer itself to
point it to a different memory region than the original
program stack. Therefore when a critical function is
called, the stack pointer has to be checked whether or
not it is within the stack boundaries of that particular
thread or process.
• Check for the address of critical function on stack:
If the critical function is not called via the ‘call’
instruction (which is the expected behavior), then the
address of the critical function should be present in
the stack as a return address.
• Check for the return address from the critical
function: Check if the instruction preceding the target
of the return address from the critical function is
a ‘call’ instruction and the address that the ‘call’
instruction transfers control to is the critical function
itself. If this is not the case, it could be a potential
target.
• Check the stack frames: If EBP is used as the stack
frame pointer, check if the EBP points to a location
outside the stack region, and if it does it means a
corruption and possible ROP exploitation.
• Simulate the execution flow: If the EBP is not used
as the stack frame pointer, then the return target
after the critical function returns may not be directly
available. In such a case, the instructions after the ‘ret’
from the critical function are simulated to check the
stack behavior. If the ‘ret’ instruction directs to an
instruction that is not preceded by a ‘call’ instruction,
it can be an ROP attack.
• Function specific check: Apart from the above
mentioned checks, some checks could be specific
to the function. The author claimed that currently
ROPGuard provides function specific checks for
the functions – VirtualProtect and LoadLibrary, by
preventing their execution.
6. COMPARISON OF APPROACHES
In this section we provide comparative evaluations of the
detection techniques discussed in the previous sections.
Tables listed here compare the techniques on different
dimensions – general evaluation (Table II), ROP specific
Effectiveness (Table III) and Performance metrics (Table
IV).
6.1. General Evaluation
In this part we focus on the general aspects of the defense
techniques like:
• Type – Type of the approach, is it executed or included
at compile-time/run-time or use a randomization
technique?
• Coverage – How much percentage or parts of the
application does the corresponding technique cover?
• Correctness – With the proposed implementation
logic, does the technique always provide correct
results or incorrect results like false positive, false
negative and true negative ?
6.1.1. Coverage
Considering the coverage achieved, almost every compile-
time technique achieves complete coverage, owing to
the availability of the source code. Dynamic approaches
also typically has full coverage with few exceptions like
kBouncer [26] and ROPGuard [28] that focus only on certain
API calls that are presumably the usual targets of ROP
exploits. Also the coverage may not be complete for those
techniques that depend on disassemblers (without debug
symbols). The accuracy and completeness of the coverage
of these techniques is proportional to the efficiency of the
latter in recovering the instructions. There is a case in IPR
[26] that only achieve 80% coverage on average. The authors
claimed that this is sufficient to randomize the popular
gadgets identified in today’s ROP exploits. However this
claim is based on their existing experiments and may not
hold for other or future exploits. On the other hand, even
with efficient disassembly some randomization approaches
cannot achieve complete coverage. Like in the case of
Marlin [18], some functions if changed from their original
location may be rendered useless/result in exception, for
example, the start function. Hence only those position-
independent functions are randomized. Similarly ILR [17]
also depends on disassemblers and position-independent
code for randomization. Therefore the amount of position-
dependent code is crucial in randomization approaches for
achieving complete coverage.
6.1.2. Correctness
Considering the correctness of the approaches, though
most of them are claimed to be false-positive proof, there
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could be certain conditions in which they would result in
false-positive, false-negative or true-negative cases. Some of
these potential conditions are shown in Table II. For example,
in those techniques that depend on the accuracy of the output
of pre-processing stages (offline stages), there is a chance
for incorrect results. For example, consider the cases of CFL
[22], ROPecker[27] and ILR [17]. In the cases of CFL which
entirely depends on the Control Flow Graph of the program,
it will result in incorrect results if the CFG is not computed
properly. Another insignificant cause of error is the improper
computation of the ‘k’ value used in lock/unlock verification.
In ROPecker, the runtime ROP checking logic depends on the
gadget database extracted offline prior to the execution based
on the results from a disassembler. Therefore the correctness
of the solution considerably depends on the correctness of
the disassembler used. Secondly, every instruction sequence
ending in an indirect control transfer is termed as a potential
gadget. Though the technique checks for chain of gadgets
rather than for one or two gadgets before concluding an
ROP attack, there is still possibility that execution of some
legitimate instruction sequences ending in indirect control
transfer can be termed as ROP. Another scenario that would
result in false negative is when the ROP gadget chain is
less than the pre-defined threshold value. Another approach
that can result in false-positive is ILR, which depends on
its offline indirect branch analysis routines for randomizing
indirect control transfer instructions.
In some cases, the possibility of incorrect behavior is due
to the limitations in the execution setup. For example, in the
case of kBouncer, the ROP checking logic only checks for
the authenticity of the branches in the LBR registers. If the
number of LBR registers is 16, and the attacker exploits an
API that has the previous 16 branches to be valid, but is still
not an intended function or contains indirect branches after
these 16 instructions, the tool cannot identify such attack and
results in false negative since the checking logic is triggered
only at the beginning of the API. Though no such instances
have been reported yet, it is not infeasible. Also regarding the
gadget chaining check, though current tested applications did
not report legitimate instruction sequences higher than the
threshold, there is no guarantee it will be the case always. In
such cases, legitimate code would be termed as ROP, being
a false-positive. Therefore it is essential that the defense
technique caters to such exceptions by including additional
checking logic to protect its correctness.
Another potential cause of false-positive is the ROP
checking logic itself. It is the case in Control Flow Moni-
toring [25] which terms any ‘jmp’ across functions/libraries
as ROP, since the technique assumes jumps typically happen
only within same functions. This is not the case always, there
could be legitimate jump outside of the functions usually as
a result of some compiler optimizations.
Let alone the ROP detection, normal program execution
itself can be affected sometimes due to the methods adopted
in the techniques. For example, consider the techniques –
IPR, G-Free and Return-less kernel that perform instruction
re-writing. Instructions are re-written to remove indirect
control transfer instruction bytes, especially the opcodes of
the ‘ret’ instruction (‘C2’, ‘C3’ etc), present in unaligned
instruction sequences.
6.2. ROP Specific Effectiveness Evaluation
In this part we focus our comparison on some ROP
specific features, including gadgets, defense strategies and
effectiveness as well, of the proposed defense techniques
(also shown in Table III):
• Type of gadgets that could be detected by the
corresponding technique – Only ‘ret’ based or ‘ret’
and ‘jmp/call’ based gadgets.
• Defense strategies that are employed in the defense
techniques (as discussed in Section 3 – especially the
first two).
• Possible limitation on its availability or potential
evasion techniques.
6.2.1. Type of gadgets
As we can see almost in all the discussed approaches
protect against the three major types of indirect control
transfer instructions – ‘ret’, ‘jmp’ and ‘call’. Some of the
earlier approaches targeted only ‘ret’ based gadgets which
served as a serious limitation among those techniques.
However the later proposed approaches have been designed
in a wiser way of handling any indirect control transfer.
6.2.2. Defense strategy
Considering the defense strategy undertaken, the trend
observed is nearly all dynamic and most of the compile-time
approaches target to enforce control flow integrity. This is
safer than gadget prevention as often times it is not possible
to identify every potential gadget by analysis. It is also the
case that not every gadget can be eliminated, as it is difficult
14 ; 00:1–21 c© John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/
Prepared using
Table II. Comparison of ROP defense techniques - General Evaluation
Technique Type Coverage Correctness
Control Flow Locking [22] Compile-time Complete binary
• Possible false positive,false negative if
the Control Flow Graph is incorrect
Control-Flow Monitoring
[25]
Dynamic Complete binary
• False positive for valid ’jmp’ across
different functions/libraries
• False positive in exception/signal han-
dling
G-Free [21] Compile-time Complete binary
• Possible error due to wrong computa-
tion of encryption/decryption
ILR [17] Randomization Excludes external libraries
• Incorrect branch target analysis may
result in false positives
IPR [16] Randomization
Covers around 80% on aver-
age
• Possible error in instruction re-writing
or re-ordering
k-Bouncer [26] Dynamic
Only certain API calls that
performs certain system-
level operations
• False positive when legitimate code
has instruction sequences greater than
threshold
• False negative if the LBR has valid
recent instructions
Marlin [18] Randomization All Functions identified
• Possible error due to incorrect symbol
resolution
ROP Defender [7] Dynamic Complete binary
• No potential cause of false positives.
Covers scenarios including exception
and signal handling
ROPecker [27] Dynamic Complete binary
• False negative if gadget chain is
less than threshold or longer gadgets
inserted between gadget chain
Return-less kernel [19] Compile-time Complete binary
• Possibility of error affecting normal
execution, due to incorrect instruction
re-writing
ROPGuard [28] Dynamic Only critical function calls
• Series of checks performed for every
invocation, so less probability of incor-
rect results
to rewrite some instructions with semantically equivalent
instructions. However some approaches like G-Free [21]
and Return-less kernels [19] focus on both the strategies by
eliminating gadgets as much as possible at pre-processing
stage and ensuring CFI at the runtime (ensured by the code
added at compile-time). Few other approaches target only at
gadget elimination like the IPR [16]. It is interesting however
that regardless of the defense strategies adopted, all these
approaches handle the execution of unaligned instructions.
6.2.3. Availability/Evasion
Regarding the availability of the approach, a possible
cause for limitation is the design itself. Techniques like
kBouncer [26] and ROPGuard [28] that are designed to
handle only certain API/function calls cannot detect ROP
attack in other execution paths that do not invoke the
selected API. The attackers can then take advantage of this
limitation and use any gadgets that may be present elsewhere
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Table III. Comparison of ROP defense techniques - ROP specific Effectiveness Evaluation
Technique Defense Strategy Gadgets Covered Availability/Potential evasion techniques
Control-Flow Locking [22] Enforce CFI ret,jmp,call None identified
Control Flow Monitoring
[25]
Enforce CFI ret,jmp,call
• Cannot be used with Position Indepen-
dent code
G-Free [21]
Enforce CFI and eliminate
gadgets
ret,jmp,call
• Access to the random key used for
encryption, may cause evasion
ILR [17]
Hinder prediction of
addresses
ret,jmp,call
• If attacker can get any unrandomized
address, may exploit and launch the
attack
IPR [16] Eliminate gadgets ret,jmp,call
• Does not eliminate every gadget,
depends on semantics and coverage
k-Bouncer [26] Enforce CFI ret,jmp,call
• Can check only LBR registers number
of branches
•
• Gadgets in other instructions excluding
the selected APIs can be evaded
Marlin [18]
Hinder prediction of
addresses
ret,jmp,call
• Strength depends on number of func-
tions randomizable
ROP Defender [7] Enforce CFI ret None identified
ROPecker [27] Enforce CFI ret,jmp,call
• If sliding window size is larger,
possible evasion by including gadgets
that all fit within one window
• Checks gadgets of length only upto 6
Return-less kernel [19]
Enforce CFI and eliminate
gadgets
ret
• If the attacker can acquire knowledge
of the return indices, he can use it
directly to populate the stack
ROPGuard [28] Enforce CFI ret
• Gadgets in other instructions excluding
the critical calls can be evaded
excluding the considered API to escape detection from these
techniques.
Few other approaches can be evaded due to the factors the
approach itself is dependent upon. For example, considering
the kBouncer approach again, the efficiency of the approach
depends on LBR registers. The registers may not only
contain the instructions of the program in concern, it may
as well contain instructions pertaining to context-switch
and other running processes. Therefore more number of
registers would help in capturing more branches of the
concerned program. In some processors the number is 4
or 8 only. Also when the number is small, there is more
probability for an attacker to circumvent the technique by
forming gadgets (in the API) with LBR number of legitimate
branches. An improvement to this would be to not entirely
depend upon the LBR registers but also include additional
logic to conclude an ROP. This is what is proposed in
ROPecker [27] which checks for past execution in LBR
registers and future execution by examining the stack trace
and comparing with gadget database. However this still has
possibilities for evasion. The approach checks for gadgets
with length of only upto a pre-defined length instructions (6
proposed in [27]. Although the pre-defined length can be any
number, it may not be easy to predict the right choice for all
applications) in its pre-processing stage of creating gadget
database. The attacker can evade this approach by either
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choosing only gadgets of length greater than 6 (in this case)
or inserting these longer gadgets in between shorter gadgets
(as identified in database) to break the chain length such that
it does not exceed the threshold. The authors of ROPecker
argued that using only long gadgets is less probable as they
usually serve little purpose in achieving useful operations
typically performed by ROP exploits. Though the proposed
length 6 may work well in today’s exploits it may not
necessarily be effective always. For the introduction of long
gadgets between shorter gadgets, the authors of ROPecker
proposed the method to count the gadget chain length across
sliding windows. For example, the chain length is considered
together in three windows and if the length exceeds this
threshold, then it is considered as ROP. Again, the number of
windows to take into account cannot be a constant value for
different applications and it is difficult to predict the required
number before execution of the application.
In a similar manner Marlin’s [18] efficiency is dependent
on the number of function blocks in the program. If an
attacker can find the address of any function by brute-force
methods and if the function contains a potential gadget,
then the technique is rendered ineffective. Therefore the
number of attempts for brute-force methods depends on the
number of functions that are available for randomization.
The attacker’s effort is directly proportional to the number of
functions identified. The authors claimed for a binary with
n randomizable functions, the number of required attempts
(brute-force methods) is n!.
Considering from a different perspective, evasion can also
happen due to the leakage of information which is crucial
to the approach. To cite an example, in G-Free [21] if an
attacker can gain access to the random key, then he/she
can easily populate the stack with the encrypted/decrypted
addresses and circumvent the check. Since the random key
is only stored in a special file, leakage is not impossible.
As discussed by the authors too, the random key must be
generated at runtime. Otherwise an asymmetric encryption
could add more protection than a symmetric one, since
encryption/decryption depends on different keys. Likewise
in Return-less kernel [19], if the attacker can get access to
the centralized return index table, he/she can use them to
populate the stack with correct indices corresponding to the
gadgets intended for exploit.
6.3. Performance Metrics
In this section we focus on the performance metrics observed
in the above defense techniques. In particular the following
criteria are studied:
• Space overhead.
• Runtime overhead.
• Dependence on side information, i.e. source code and
debug symbols.
• Dependency of the technique on any other external
framework/libraries.
6.3.1. Space Overhead
Most of the overhead is incurred from storing the results
of pre-processing stages in databases. In the case of ILR [17],
database is required for storing the identified instructions
from the binary and re-write rules. In ROPecker [27]
and kBouncer [26], information about potential gadgets
identified at offline stages are stored in database. Databases
for shared libraries can be shared across processes. Likewise
in Marlin [18], database is required for storing the function
symbols extracted that are used for randomization. In Return-
less kernel [19], the overhead is from the centralized return
index table. If the size of the table is limited, and the
number of functions (valid ‘ret’ instructions) exceed the size
of the table, then other techniques like double indirection
may need to be employed. Sometimes the overhead is from
additional frameworks involved like the PIN framework
in ROPDefender [7] and Control Flow Monitoring. The
approach that has the minimal overhead among all mentioned
mechanisms is IPR [16]. Since the randomizations in IPR are
in-place there is no requirement for additional information
storage.
6.3.2. Runtime overhead
The runtime overhead is usually high for dynamic
approaches in general owing to the actual work done during
the program execution. ROP defense techniques are no
exception. Particularly ROPDefender [7] and Control Flow
Monitoring [25] have reported upto 2X and 3.5X average
total execution time respectively. Both these approaches
use the PIN framework, which is the major cause of such
high overheads. Though the framework has a code cache to
save frequently repeated instructions, if the number of these
repeated instructions is much larger compared to the code
cache size, then there are chances of increased performance
overhead. There are few other dynamic approaches (not
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discussed in this paper) like DROP [29], TRUSS [30] which
incurs worser overheads of upto 5X on average. On the
other hand, though kBouncer [26] and ROPGuard [28] are
dynamic approaches they have comparatively low overheads
due to their ROP checking logic being triggered only for
specific API calls. In the case of ROPecker the sliding
window size greatly affects the runtime overhead. Small
windows means more exceptions which would in turn mean
increased overhead and vice versa. However larger window
sizes have the disadvantage of the possibility of being able to
fit all ROP gadgets within one window to escape detection.
Another source of runtime overhead in ROPecker is from
the instruction emulation performed to check the future
execution flow of the program at the time of checking.
Compile-time approaches usually do not have higher
runtime overheads, as most of the work is performed
compile-time as suggested by their name itself. This minimal
overhead is caused by the ROP checking logic added to the
code like the encryption/decryption in G-Free, return index
computation in return-less kernel and lock/unlock in CFL.
Randomization approaches’ overhead is somewhere
between the compile and dynamic time approaches. Since
randomization is done for the instruction locations, there
is not too much work involved during the execution of the
actual application in concern. This holds well especially
in the case of IPR [16], where the very minimal overhead
could be caused by some re-writing instructions that may
be less optimal than the compiled version. However an
approach like ILR [17] that randomizes every instruction
(position-independent), the next instruction to be executed
is determined at runtime only by the per-process virtual
machine employed for this specific purpose. In such cases,
the runtime overhead is obviously higher. In the case
of Marlin [18], the overhead is at load-time when the
randomization is performed based on the symbol resolution
database. The authors of Marlin also proposed to reduce
the effort of pre-processing stage by making it a one-
time step, rather than repeating for every execution. In
fact Marlin tries to achieve a fine trade-off between
the performance overhead (randomizing function blocks
rather than individual instructions) and effectiveness (better
compared to ASLR which randomizes only parts of process
like stack and heap).
6.3.3. Dependence on side information
As already discussed in Section 4, compile-time
approaches require source-code. Most of the other
approaches do not require any side information, with
few exceptions that depend on debug symbols. Although
those approaches that do not depend on such information use
disassemblers to retrieve the instructions (without symbolic
debugging information), they cannot be guaranteed for
complete coverage always. The dependence on side
information for each approach is shown in the Table IV.
6.3.4. Dependence on framework/hardware
Almost every approach depends on disassemblers to
retrieve the instruction sequences from program binary
for gadget analysis. Typically IDADiassembler is used for
windows applications and ReadELF for Unix applications.
Few dynamic approaches like ROPDefender [7] and Control
FLow Monitoring [25] that maintain a shadow stack and
compare every indirect control transfer instruction uses
the PIN dynamic binary instrumentation framework for
the runtime monitoring. ILR [17] depends on per-process
virtual machine for fetching the next instructions. These
dependencies are kind of external that needs to be integrated
with the technique. Some techniques depend on built-in
support (i.e. hardware) that is provided with the processor
itself like in the cases of kBouncer [26] and ROPecker [27].
These techniques depend on the LBR registers that is present
in the processor itself.
7. DISCUSSION - TOWARDS EFFICIENT
ROP DEFENSE
This section aims at discussing some of the essential factors
and insights towards efficient detection and prevention of
ROP attacks. Based on the observations made on surveyed
defense techniques (discussed in the previous sections), the
following properties are considered essential for a robust and
effective approach:
• Defense strategy: As discussed before, ROP Defense
could adopt either gadget elimination or control flow
integrity or sometimes combine both. Considering
only gadget elimination or modification, it may not
be enough to remove every available gadget. As
a result there are still chances that the attacker’s
targeted instructions are not affected by the process.
Also some of the attacker’s operations could be in
such a way that, in a gadget of many number of
instructions, modification of one or some part of the
gadget may not have any significant effect on the
gadget’s actual intended operations. Considering the
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Table IV. Comparison of ROP Defense techniques - Performance Metrics
Technique Space Overhead Runtime Overhead Side Information Externaldependencies
Control-Flow locking
[22]
Lock/unlock code Minimal Yes None
Control-Flow
Monitoring [25]
PIN (including shadow
stack)
Upto 3.5X on avg. No
Disassembler,
ReadELF, PIN
framework
G-Free [21]
Encrypt/Decrypt code,
increased by 26% on avg
3% on avg. Yes None
ILR [17]
Instruction database,
re-write rules, per-process
VM
Mainly from VM, 13-16%
on avg.
Yes Disassembler
IPR [16] None significant Minimal No Disassembler
k-Bouncer[26]
Offline analysis result
tables, detours frwk
Minimal, only for API calls No
LBR registers,
Detours
framework
Marlin [18] Symbol resolution database None No
Disassembler,
ReadELF
Return-less kernel [19] Centralized Index table Minimal Yes None
ROP Defender [7]
PIN (including shadow
stack)
Upto 2X on avg. No PIN framework
ROPGuard [28] None significant
Minimal, only for critical
functions
No None
ROPecker [27] Instruction gadget database
Mainly from ROP check
and emulation, depends on
sliding window size
No LBR registers
control flow integrity strategy, though this is more
effective in ensuring the program that is not diverted
from its expected behavior, it incurs higher overheads
owing to the large number of indirect control transfer
instructions in a typical application. To improve such
overheads, it would be beneficial to implement both
the strategies – gadget elimination and enforcing CFI.
• Gadget types: Though the attack started with ROP
i.e only ‘ret’ instruction based, as put forth by
Checkoway.et,al [8] and Bletsch.et.al, [9], it could
be directed via the ‘jump/call’ instructions as well.
Therefore an efficient defense technique must account
for all types of indirect control transfer instructions
– ‘ret’, ‘jmp’ and ‘call’. It is also important that
these gadget types are covered in both aligned and
unaligned instructions.
• Gadget length: In the process of gadget elimination,
most approaches consider short gadgets only, of
length upto 5 or 6 instructions. This is based on
the observations from current ROP exploits. Though
this may be sufficient for detecting today’s exploits,
it may not be correct invariably. With the extent
of research advancing in the area of ROP, future
defense techniques need to be robust enough to
handle gadgets of varying length, independent of
assumptions. kBouncer [26] is good in this aspect, it
considers gadget length of upto 20 instructions.
• Other Parameters: Besides the gadget length
discussed before, some other parameters that need to
be well chosen are threshold values in looking for
gadget chains and frequency or number of indirect
branches executed. Poor choice of these values
without proper rationale may result in increased false-
positives.
• Dependency: It is not unusual or unnecessary for
a defense technique to be dependent on external
factors like hardware, frameworks and libraries.
But it is important that the dependency does
not affect the efficiency or performance of the
technique. Like in the case of kBouncer which is
dependent on LBR registers, its efficiency is directly
proportional to the number of available registers.
Considering performance impact, some approaches
that requires an instrumentation framework, have very
high overheads making their usage difficult.
• Security for ROP logic: Almost every approach is
based on the assumption that the tool/ROP checking
logic itself is protected from any misuse by attackers.
It is important that this expected integrity and security
is guaranteed to prevent evasion.
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8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Return-Oriented Programming is a recent type of software
attack that exploits the buffer overflow vulnerability. Recent
advancements in this subject has resulted in various types
of both – ROP exploits and ROP defense mechanisms.
This paper focuses on the defense techniques particularly
those proposed in recent few years. This paper provides a
brief classification of the defense mechanisms and discusses
some of them in details. A comparative evaluation of
the techniques is also provided focusing on ROP specific
parameters and certain other general parameters. This paper
also provides some insights into the important aspects to
be considered for future developing an efficient defense
mechanism.
Besides the techniques discussed there are certain other
techniques also which though not specific to ROP, can still
be used in detecting such type of code re-use attacks. Also
few hardware-based virtualization approaches have been
proposed to mitigate ROP recently. An extended survey
including these approaches as well is considered to be
included in future work.
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